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For generations, commenta-tors have decried the fact that we live in an era of an impe-
rial presidency. The second Presi-
dent Bush famously (or infamously) 
ignored Congress in subjecting sus-
pected terrorists around the world to 
military commissions at Guantanamo 
Bay and citizens and suspected ter-
rorists alike to warrantless surveil-
lance of their phone calls. President 
Barack Obama, like his predecessor, 
has used executive power to shape 
rules and regulations that Congress 
had delegated to subordinates in 
agencies as opposed to the President 
directly. Both Presidents claimed 
broad power to circumvent the Sen-
ate’s power to consent to treaties and 
appointments. Congress and the 
courts have fought back to limit the 
scope of presidential power, at least 
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a com-
parable battle over executive power 
brewed one hundred and twenty-five 
years ago, culminating in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In 
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case 
questioned the President’s inherent 
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal 
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a 
sitting United States Supreme Court 
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted 
the potential assailant, David Terry, 
and killed him when he thought Jus-
tice Field’s life was in danger. Cali-
fornia authorities were none too 
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Illustration, from The Life of David S. Terry, by A. E. Wagstaff, 1892, Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/
details/lifeofdavidsterr00wags, p. 410.
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pleased given that Terry had been so 
prominent in California political life 
and that Terry likely was unarmed. 
Local officials indicted and then im-
prisoned Neagle for killing the Cali-
fornian.  
Events leading up to the Supreme 
Court decision read like a soap opera, 
perhaps revealing more about the 
interplay of society and politics than 
does the decision itself. The history 
of the case starts with David Terry, 
who before the Civil War served 
on California’s Supreme Court with 
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained 
notoriety by challenging Senator 
Broderick from California, a for-
mer friend who was also a friend of 
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broder-
ick dead. The dispute centered over 
political rivalries, in part due to Ter-
ry’s sympathy with the Confederacy. 
Terry was acquitted and then left 
California to support the South in 
the Civil War. After the War, Terry 
returned to law practice and politics 
in California and, of relevance here, 
within twenty years fell within the 
orbit of an apparently glamorous but 
unstable woman named Sarah Al-
thea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became 
the companion of Senator William 
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed 
great sums from real estate and 
mining investments. Sharon, who 
was much older than Hill, evidently 
sundered relations when he suspect-
ed Hill’s designs on his money. Hill 
continued to plot how to separate 
Sharon from some of his enormous 
wealth. She made a demand on 
Sharon for alimony, asserting that 
Sharon had married her some three 
years earlier when they had started 
their “companionship.” In so do-
ing, she presented what likely were 
forged documents attesting to the 
marriage relationship. Sharon sued 
in federal court in California (due 
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883 
for a declaration that no marriage 
had ever taken place. Hill then filed 
her own suit in state court in 1884 
to demonstrate that the marriage 
was valid and requested a share of 
Sharon’s property. She hired Terry as 
one of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided 
the case in Hill’s favor even though 
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon 
immediately appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court but died be-
fore the case was heard. His executor 
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit 
proceeded slowly, prompting more 
aberrant behavior from Hill. She 
sported a pistol at many of the pro-
ceedings, and waved it at witnesses. 
She threatened to have adverse wit-
nesses and their counsel killed. Al-
though Justice Field, by then serving 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not 
assigned to preside over the case, 
he was assigned as a Justice riding 
on circuit to hear several motions 
arising out of the case. During one 
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort 
to maintain decorum ordered that 
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found 
her in contempt of court. At the end 
of the proceedings in 1886, the fed-
eral court determined that the mar-
riage was a sham and the documents 
forged.
Terry then married Hill, man-
ifesting an intriguing view of the 
attorney-client relationship. More 
importantly, the marriage placed 
pressure on his successors on the 
California Supreme Court to uphold 
the state court finding that Hill had 
been married to Sharon. A divided 
California Supreme Court acqui-
esced, affirming the trial court’s de-
cision that a valid marriage had in-
deed taken place.
In a complicated procedural 
move, the estate then moved to revive 
the federal court decree and enjoin 
both Hill and Terry from maintain-
ing the validity of the prior marriage, 
despite the state court ruling. At 
this point, the case was assigned to 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Field, sitting by designation. Field 
in 1888 determined that Hill had 
obtained the marriage documents 
through fraud. As he orally delivered 
the decision, Hill caused a commo-
tion in the courtroom protesting the 
ruling and had to be escorted out. 
Terry in a display of chivalry there-
upon attacked the marshal for car-
rying out Field’s order. Field ordered 
both Terry, his former associate on 
the California Supreme Court, and 
Hill imprisoned for contempt of 
court. Hill threatened Field’s life and 
Terry claimed that Field’s decision had 
been bought with Sharon’s money. Ter-
ry then sought a pardon from Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland, asserting in 
part that Field was retaliating against 
him for refusing to throw his support 
to Field in a prior presidential pri-
mary. Cleveland declined, and Terry 
served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently 
became even more consumed by 
revenge, broadcasting widely his 
intent to harm Justice Field. When 
Justice Field traveled back west from 
Washington, newspapers speculated 
on when the confrontation would 
occur. Accordingly, President Benja-
min Harrison through his Attorney 
General assigned Marshal Neagle to 
protect Justice Field.
  The confrontation arose in the summer of 1889 when Field 
traveled by train from San Francis-
co to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife 
boarded the train at a stop along 
the way and entered a dining room 
in which Justice Field was eating 
breakfast. Hill left the room—pre-
sumably to gather her pistol from her 
chamber—but her husband did not 
wait and circled behind Justice Field 
and delivered two blows to his head. 
Neagle, the marshal, announced his 
presence and called on Terry to stop. 
Terry made a move as if to draw a 
knife that he customarily carried, 
and Neagle responded with two 
shots from his pistol, killing the 
assailant.
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A local constable arrested Nea-
gle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her 
return to San Francisco, swore out a 
complaint for murder against both 
Field and Neagle. California author-
ities then arrested Field who was 
released under a bond. An eastern 
newspaper reported the following 
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge 
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the 
judge.”
Field immediately filed for a writ 
of habeas corpus, and the federal 
court within a matter of days grant-
ed Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice 
Field’s stay at the other end of the 
courtroom.
Marshal Neagle was not as for-
tunate—he unquestionably fired 
the shots that killed Terry. He filed 
a similar writ of habeas corpus from 
a California prison, asserting that 
he acted within the line of duty in 
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was 
moved to San Francisco, but remained 
behind bars. He argued that, to the ex-
tent his actions were undertaken pur-
suant to federal authority, his conduct 
could only be challenged in federal 
court. The federal court eventually 
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the 
writ, reasoning in part that “upon 
general, immutable principles, the 
power must be necessarily inherent 
in the executive department of any 
government worthy of the name of 
government, to protect itself in all 
matters to which its authority ex-
tends; and this necessarily involves 
Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing 
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress64
the power to protect all the agency 
and instrumentalities necessary to 
accomplish the objects and purposes 
of government.” The Supreme Court 
accepted the case for review at Cali-
fornia’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects 
the generation-old conflict inherent 
in our system of federalism.  Some 
Californians were resentful that the 
federal courts did not respect the 
state courts’ determination that a 
valid marriage had been entered into 
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover, 
authorities in California were more 
than willing to imprison and indict 
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Mar-
shal was following presidential or-
ders. Others in California believed 
that California courts should be 
trusted to determine whether Nea-
gle’s defense was valid without in-
terference from the federal courts. 
Whatever one thinks of the resur-
gent importance of federalism in our 
generation—including petitions for 
secession filed in the wake of Pres-
ident Obama’s 2012 victory—few 
proponents today would be so bold 
as to approve of California’s im-
prisonment of a U.S. Marshal who 
unquestionably was acting pursu-
ant to the President’s orders, not to 
mention local authorities’ decision 
to arrest Justice Field himself. The 
story reminds us that, no matter 
how intense regional divides may be 
today, they pale before the tensions 
between states and the federal gov-
ernment over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case 
reveal more—a sordid tale of love 
gone awry, reminiscent of politi-
cians’ struggles more recently, from 
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on 
the aptly named boat “Monkey Busi-
ness” to President Bill Clinton’s fling 
with an intern, and from Wilbur 
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian 
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
In re Neagle Supreme Court decision, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent 
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs 
impact not only political races, but 
Supreme Court decisions as well. 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), 
was not the first Supreme Court case 
on presidential power sparked by 
politicians’ sexual misconduct.
The doctrinal legacy of In re Neagle endures. A divided U.S. 
Supreme Court, with Justice Field 
recusing himself, held that the Pres-
ident enjoys a residuum of authority 
under Article II of the Constitution 
to take steps to protect the nation 
even if those steps are not spelled out 
by Congress. In presaging presiden-
tial power debates of the last decade, 
the Court concluded that the Presi-
dent could rely on powers not direct-
ly rooted in the text of the Consti-
tution in safeguarding the country. 
The Court explained, “In the view 
we take of the Constitution of the 
United States, any obligation fair-
ly and properly inferrible from that 
instrument” is appropriate, includ-
ing the duty to protect a Supreme 
Court Justice, even in the absence of 
explicit congressional authorization. 
The Court continued that “it would 
be a great reproach to the system 
of government of the United States, 
declared to be within its sphere sov-
ereign and supreme, if there is to be 
found within the domain of its pow-
ers no means of protecting the judg-
es, in the conscientious and faithful 
discharge of their duties, from the 
malice and hatred of those upon 
whom their judgments may operate 
unfavorably.”  Presidents can “infer” 
powers from the Constitution—in-
cluding the duty to protect Justices 
from harm.  In the case, those non-
statutory or “inferrible” powers dis-
placed California’s authority to try 
Neagle for murder and provided 
Neagle a complete defense to the 
charge. Although the accumulation 
of powers and responsibilities over 
the last 125 years has radically trans-
formed the presidency, the debate 
over the scope of presidential powers 
under Article II is not new. There is a 
residuum of authority under Article 
II—even if the extent remains in bit-
ter dispute—permitting presidents 
leeway to ensure protection of the 
government and the nation itself. ◆
